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Abstract 
The Einstellung (set) effect occurs when the first idea that comes to mind, triggered by familiar 
features of a problem, prevents a better solution being found. It has been shown to affect both 
people facing novel problems and experts within their field of expertise. We show that it works 
by influencing mechanisms that determine what information is attended to. Having found one 
solution, expert chess players reported that they were looking for a better one. But their eye 
movements showed that they continued to look at features of the problem related to the solution 
they had already thought of. The mechanism which allows the first schema activated by 
familiar aspects of a problem to control the subsequent direction of attention may contribute to 
a wide range of biases both in everyday and expert thought - from confirmation bias in 
hypothesis testing to the tendency of scientists to ignore results that do not fit their favoured 
theories. 
 
Key words: Einstellung (set) effect, Fixation, Problem solving, Expertise, Eye movements, 
Chess, Confirmation bias, Thinking 
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Why Good Thoughts Block Better Ones: The Mechanism of the Pernicious Einstellung Effect 
 
The difficulty lies, not in the new 
ideas, but in escaping from the old 
ones, which ramify ... into every 
corner of our minds. 
John Maynard Keynes (1936/1973; 
p. xxiii) 
 
 The counter-intuitive possibility that prior knowledge can have a negative effect on 
future performance is a theme in a range of areas of psychology that at first sight might seem 
unrelated. For example, in negative transfer paradigms previous experience makes it more 
difficult to adapt to a new setting than it would be without such experience (Besnard & Cacitti, 
2005; McCloy, Beaman, Morgan, & Speed, 2007; Schwartz, Bransford, & Sears, 2005; Singley 
& Anderson, 1989; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). Similarly, in the part-set cueing 
phenomenon people who are given a portion of previously studied/memorized material were in 
fact hampered by this ‘help’ when they tried to recall the remaining material compared to 
people who were just asked to recall the material (Roediger, 1973; Basden & Basden, 1995. 
Another example is offered by insight problems, first investigated by Köhler (1917/1925), 
Maier (1930, 1931) and Duncker (1945). Although there are different theories of why these 
problems are so hard to solve, most agree that the difficulty lies in the initial mental 
representation of the problem, determined by prior knowledge, from which people are unable to 
escape even though it does not lead to a successful solution (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Kershaw 
& Ohlsson, 2004; Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; MacGregor, Ormerod, & 
Chronicle, 2001; Ohlsson, 1992; Smith, 1995). A similar effect can be found in the motor 
system. Common actions become automated through frequent use and are triggered by familiar 
situations without conscious thought. This usually leads to efficient responses to the demands 
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of everyday life. But when a specific context is strongly associated with a well-learnt, but now 
inappropriate, pattern, the familiar pattern can emerge with unintended results (Norman, 1981). 
These may be amusing (or embarrassing) if one dials a familiar telephone number at the wrong 
time (e.g., Woltz, Gardner, & Bell, 2000). But the result can be catastrophic if someone 
controlling a nuclear reactor executes a common but now inappropriate sequence (Reason, 
1990). Finally, the way people seek information is biased by their prior knowledge. When 
people test a theory, they look for evidence that is consistent with what they already believe 
rather than objectively assessing any evidence even if it might disconfirm their previously held 
belief (Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; McKenzie, 2006; Nickerson, 1997; Wason, 1960; 
Westen, Kilts, Blagov, Harenski, & Hamann, 2006).  
 An instance of the negative impact of previous knowledge is known as the Einstellung 
(set) effect. This occurs when the first idea that comes to mind, triggered by previous 
experience with similar situations, prevents alternatives being considered. If this initial idea is 
not the best way to solve the problem, the optimum solution may be missed. The effect was 
first demonstrated experimentally by Luchins (1942), who gave people a series of problems that 
could be solved by a fixed method which they quickly learnt. Then he gave them a problem that 
appeared similar to the previous ones but which could not be solved by the same method (the 
‘extinction’ problem). Many said it was insoluble. The fixation of thought displayed by these 
people was demonstrated by a control group who were given only the extinction problem. They 
solved it quickly, showing that the problem was not intrinsically difficult. The experimental 
group failed to find the solution because the similarity of the final problem to the previous ones 
brought the usual (and now inappropriate) method to mind, preventing them from considering 
alternatives.   
 The Einstellung effect has been repeatedly demonstrated in the laboratory in a variety of 
forms using problems that do not require prior knowledge of the problem domain (e.g., Atwood 
& Polson, 1976; Chen & Mo, 2004; Delaney, Ericsson, & Knowles, 2004; Lippman, 1996; 
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Lovett & Anderson, 1996; McKelvie, 1990). These studies show that mental set can be induced 
by a small number of similar problems in people who have never experienced the task before. It 
can also be used to demonstrate the mechanisms behind the mistakes made by experts. Experts 
rarely make mistakes but when they do, it is usually because they think the situation is a 
familiar one and apply their usual, but now inappropriate, methods to find a solution (Singley & 
Anderson, 1989; Reason, 1990). For example, most errors that doctors make are not connected 
to their inadequate medical knowledge but rather to the tendency to form opinions quickly 
based on previous experience. Once the initial diagnosis is formed, it guides doctors in the 
search of supporting evidence which in turn brings dangers of missing important aspects 
unrelated to the initial diagnosis (Croskerry, 2003; Graber, Franklin, Gordon, 2005; Groopman, 
2007; Kassirer & Kopelman, 1989). Such errors by experts with real life problems (where the 
errors are induced by knowledge of a well-learned procedure in long-term memory) resemble 
errors induced by Einstellung problems in the laboratory (where the mind set is induced by 
short-term memory of a newly learned procedure). 
 Despite the potential importance of the Einstellung effect for understanding why experts 
sometimes fail to find the optimum solution to a problem within their area of expertise, there 
are few studies investigating the effect with experts (for similar research on how experts can 
fail outside their domain, see Frensch & Sternberg, 1989; Hecht & Proffitt, 1995; and Wiley, 
1998). One set of studies that has looked at this is Saariluoma’s (1990; 1992) demonstration 
that skilful chess players can fall victim to the Einstellung effect. The players tried to solve a 
number of chess problems where a familiar motif led to the solution. They were then presented 
with a problem that had two solutions. One was the familiar solution they had used to solve the 
previous problem, but was sub-optimal; the other was less familiar but optimal. Most players 
failed to find the optimal solution in the presence of the familiar solution. Saariluoma 
concluded that chess players can suffer from the Einstellung effect. 
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 Bilalić, McLeod, and Gobet (2008) extended Saariluoma’s observations, confirming 
that expert chess players can experience the Einstellung effect, and showing that it can be 
quantified. They showed expert players (Candidate Masters, Masters, and International 
Masters
1) a number of problems such as the one shown in Figure 1a, and asked them to find the 
shortest way for White to achieve checkmate. There were two solutions, one a well-known 
solution (smothered mate) taking five moves and the other (the optimal solution) a less familiar 
one taking three moves. The players who found the familiar solution but failed to find the 
optimal one were then shown a similar problem where the familiar solution had been disabled, 
leaving only the optimal one (shown in Figure 1b). All the experts found the shorter solution in 
the 1-solution problem, showing that they were capable of finding it when not distracted by the 
familiar one. To quantify the impact which the familiar solution had on the performance of 
expert players in the 2-solution problem, Bilalić et al. (2008) exploited one of the advantages of 
chess as a domain for studying problem solving – the presence of an interval scale for 
measurement of skill (see Footnote 1). 
Similarly to the studies on transfer, Bilalić et al. (2008) used a control group of weaker 
players (Class A, Class B, and Class C) and showed them the 1-solution problem only. The 
Einstellung effect was quantified by seeing how much weaker a player had to be, when only the 
optimal solution was present, to show comparable performance to that of a better player when 
the distracting effect of the familiar solution was present (for similar measures of transfer see 
the first chapter of Singley & Anderson, 1989). The performance of the International Masters (5 
SDs above average) on the 2-solution problem was comparable to that of the Class A players (2 
SDs above average) on the 1-solution problem, the performance of the Masters (4 SDs above 
average) was comparable to that of the Class B players (1 SD above average) and the 
performance of the Candidate Masters (3SDs above average) was the same as the Class C 
players (average). Across a range of skill levels, the presence of a familiar solution that first 
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came to mind reduced the problem solving performance of the experts to that of players about 
three standard deviations lower in skill. Similar results were obtained using different problems 
and the more naturalistic instruction to find the best move (Bilalić et al., 2008). Three standard 
deviations is a gulf in skill level. The chance of a player being beaten by one 600 Elo points 
lower is close to zero. And yet the Einstellung effect temporarily reduced the problem solving 
ability of the experts to that of the less skilled players. It is a very powerful effect.  
--------------------------- 
Figure 1 
--------------------------- 
Bilalić et al. (2008) also found that the Einstellung effect could not be demonstrated 
with Grand Masters (players more than five SDs above mean chess skill) with the problems 
shown in Figure 1 because they all found the optimal solution to the 2-solution problem. But 
Grandmasters did show the Einstellung effect in problems where the optimal solution was more 
difficult to find. Similarly, with problems where the less obvious solution was easier to find 
than in this one, the Einstellung effect could no longer be demonstrated with Candidate Masters 
because they all found the optimal solution to the 2-solution problem. But with these easier 
problems the effect could now be measured with weaker players (e.g., Class A) as the necessary 
control group of even weaker players (i.e., weaker than Class C) started to find the optimal 
solution in the 1-solution problem. Thus the demonstration of the Einstellung effect depends on 
an interaction between the skill of the individual and the difficulty of the less obvious solution. 
With harder problems it can be demonstrated with stronger players, with easier problems it can 
be demonstrated with weaker players. The ability to resist the Einstellung effect and find the 
optimal solution in any given problem is greater the more skilful the player. But the effect can 
still be shown, with a problem of appropriate difficulty, whatever the level of expertise of the 
individual player.  
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We show, by measuring players’ eye movements, that the mechanism by which the first 
idea prevents a better idea coming to mind can be demonstrated. Crucially, we find that players 
believed that they were actively searching for better solutions when in fact they continued to 
look at aspects of the problem related to the first idea they considered. This is why the 
Einstellung effect is pernicious – people do not realize that it is influencing their thoughts. 
Experiment 1 
 Why did many of the players fail to find the optimal solution to the 2-solution problem 
(Figure 1a) in Bilalić et al. (2008)? Is it possible that the players were so blinded by the familiar 
solution that they did not notice at all the critical features necessary to find the better one? Or is 
it plausible that they noticed the critical features but could not connect them with the optimal 
solution? In the previous experiments we used verbal protocols to glean insights into the 
mechanisms involved in the Einstellung effect. These showed that all players, even after they 
had spotted the familiar solution, looked further for a better one. Unfortunately, the verbal 
protocols did not provide a lot of information about what aspects of the position players 
attended to when looking for a better solution. The problem used in this study was similar to 
problems used in insight studies in that the finding of the optimal solution occurs suddenly. The 
players did not verbalize much just before the insight either because they did not look very hard 
due to the satisfactory nature of the first solution, or they did not have any indication that they 
were close to a better solution. It has been shown that people cannot adequately report how 
close they are to solving insight problems (Metcalfe, 1987; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). It has 
also been argued that verbal protocols may not be helpful when trying to understand the 
cognitive processes engaged in solving insight problems (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). 
Another limitation of the use of verbal protocols in this context is that chess is visuo-spatial in 
character and it may not always be possible to recode visuo-spatial information into verbal 
statements (de Groot & Gobet, 1996). 
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 A possible solution is to measure the players’ eye movements. Unlike verbal protocols, 
eye fixations unambiguously provide information about which features of the display are 
attended (Rayner, 1998). The direction of gaze shows which features of the problem have been 
attended to, and the amount of time spent fixated is related to the amount of time spent 
processing them (Findlay & Gilchrist, 1998; Just & Carpenter, 1976). The technique of 
measuring eye movements has provided useful information when applied to general problems 
(Epelboim & Suppes, 2001; Hodgson, Bajwa, Owen, & Kennard, 2000; Van Gog, Paas, & Van 
Merrienboer, 2005) as well as to insight (Grant & Spivey, 2003; Jones, 2003; Knoblich, 
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001) and chess problems (Charness, Reingold, Pomplun, & Stampe, 2001; 
de Groot & Gobet, 1996; Reingold, Charness, Pomplun, & Stampe, 2001; Reingold, Charness, 
Schultetus, & Stampe, 2001; Tikhomirov & Poznyanskaya, 1966). 
 On the basis of the results in Bilalić et al.’s (2008) Experiment 1 we assumed that 
players of Candidate Master level would fail to find the optimal solution in the 2-solution 
problem but that they would find it in the 1-solution problem. This would enable us to compare 
the eye movements of players failing to find the optimal solution to the 2-solution problem 
(who experienced the Einstellung effect) with the eye movements of  players succeeding in 
finding it in the 1-solution problem (who did not). 
Method 
Participants. Two groups of Candidate Masters, all male, participated in the experiment 
(see Table 1 for details). The experts had not participated in previous experiments on the 
Einstellung effect and were recruited from local chess clubs in Oxford and Witney (England). 
They were offered £15 or a copy of a chess program for their participation in the experiment.  
--------------------------- 
Table 1 
--------------------------- 
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 Stimuli. The two problems shown in Figure 1 were used. The first problem, Figure 1a, 
has two solutions. One is smothered mate, a familiar sequence to any skilled player. This is an 
elegant and easily remembered motif, taught to all young chess players, where the strongest 
piece, the queen, is sacrificed in order to draw one of the opponent’s pieces onto a square that 
blocks the escape square for the king. This sequence solves the problem by producing 
checkmate in five moves. There is also a shorter but less familiar solution that solves the 
problem by delivering checkmate in three moves. In the second problem (Figure 1b) only the 
shorter solution is possible. The smothered mate has been disabled by changing just one 
element in the problem (moving Black’s white-squared bishop from c6 to h5). Otherwise the 
problems are the same.  
 Design, procedure, and apparatus. The first group was presented with the 1-solution 
problem only. The second group was first shown the 2-solution problem and then the 1-solution 
problem if they failed to find the shortest solution to the 2-solution problem. Both groups were 
told that they should look for the shortest way to win and that they would have unlimited time 
to find the solution. The instruction was to “find the shortest way to win” rather than the more 
ambiguous “find the best move” as it is difficult to argue that the shorter solution is ‘better’ 
than the smothered mate solution. Any player in the second group who failed to find the shorter 
solution was then shown the 1-solution problem (Figure 1b) with the same instructions. As in 
normal tournament play, the players were not allowed to move the pieces. 
 The problems were shown using images (400 x 400 pixels) created with ChessBase 8, 
standard chess software that produces images familiar to most players. The squares on the 
image measured 4.9 x 4.6 cm. The problems were presented on a plasma screen 70 cm from the 
players. The players’ eye movements were recorded by an iView 3 RED II infra-red remote 
eye-tracking device from SensoMotoric Instruments, sampling at 50 Hz. The system had an 
error of 0.5 – 1o, corresponding to 0.6 to 1.2 cm on the board. We used a nine-point calibration 
with bi-quadratic functions before each problem. 
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The players watched the board with their head on a chin rest. A practice problem (a 
middle game position) was presented first to make participants familiar with the procedure of 
calibration. Players were required to look at a fixation cross in the centre of the screen to 
establish a similar starting point for all players. They were instructed to announce their solution 
only when they were certain of it. They did not talk during problem solving as head movement 
associated with talking reduces the accuracy of the eye movement recording. After announcing 
the solution, retrospective verbal protocols were collected from the players (de Groot & Gobet, 
1996; Ericsson & Simon, 1993). The sessions lasted for about 20 minutes. 
Eye movement analysis. The analysis will focus on the time spent fixating the crucial 
squares for at least 100 ms. To combine eye movement data across subjects who took different 
lengths of time to solve the problem, the problem solving process was divided into six intervals 
(see Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001, for a similar procedure of analysing eye movement 
data). The first interval was the first ten seconds when players were getting familiar with the 
position. The last interval was the last five seconds before players found the optimal solution 
(1-solution problem) or before they proposed the suboptimal solution (in the 2-solution 
problem). The remaining problem-solving period was divided into four intervals of equal 
duration.  
 Eight expert chess players who did not participate in the study (M Elo 2294 ± 192; M 
age = 27 ± 4; two female) were asked to indicate the importance of a number of squares for the 
smothered mate and optimal solutions. They estimated the importance using a 7 point likert 
scale (three points on the scale were labelled: 1 = unimportant, 4 = moderately important, 7 = 
very important). The estimates of the relative importance of the squares are shown in Table 2. 
On the basis of these estimates we chose the squares b2, h6, h7, and g7 (marked by circles in 
Figure 1a) as critical for the optimal solution but not the smothered mate, and the squares f7, 
g5, and g8 (marked by squares) as critical for the smothered mate solution but not the optimal 
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solution. The percentage of the time spent on these squares was taken as the dependent 
variable.  
--------------------------- 
Table 2 
--------------------------- 
Results and discussion 
The group who were only shown the 1-solution problem all found the optimal solution, 
needing on average 79 s (SD = 25) to do so. The group who were shown the 2-solution problem 
all said, like the players of comparable skill in Bilalić et al. (2008) Experiment 1, that the 
smothered mate was the shortest solution, taking on average 37 seconds (SD = 20) to reach this 
decision. All players facing the 2-solution problem reported that after they had found the 
smothered mate they looked for a shorter mate but failed to find one. They nevertheless found 
the optimal solution when shown the 1-solution problem (Mean = 148 s, SD = 90), showing 
that they were experiencing the Einstellung effect when they failed to find the shorter solution 
to the 2-solution problem. 
To investigate the mechanism of the Einstellung effect we compared the eye movements 
of players who were experiencing the Einstellung effect (Group 2 looking at the 2-solution 
problem) with those who were not (Group 1 looking at the 1-solution problem). Figure 2 shows 
the percentage of time that the two groups spent looking at the two sets of squares identified as 
more important for one solution or the other, or at the control set of squares. Initially, the group 
looking at the 2-solution problem (Figure 2a) spent more time looking at the squares relevant to 
the smothered mate (the open circles). Having found that solution, they said in their 
retrospective protocols that they were looking for a shorter one. But, in fact, they continued to 
look at squares relevant to the familiar smothered mate solution throughout the time they spent 
on the problem (the interaction between the % of time looking at the two sets of squares and the 
six time periods was not significant - F (5, 20)
 
= 0.6, ns). In contrast, the group looking at the 1-
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solution problem (Figure 2b) spent gradually more time looking at the squares relevant to the 
optimal solution (the filled triangles) that they eventually found (the interaction between the % 
of time looking at the two sets of squares and the six time periods was significant - F (5, 20) 
 
= 
11.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .75). Although the group looking at the 2-solution problem (Figure 2a) all 
stated that they were actively looking for alternatives after spotting the smothered mate, and 
presumably believed they were doing so, they spent much of their time continuing to look at the 
squares that were crucial to the smothered mate. Presumably, the new ideas they considered 
were related to the familiar solution. The players did spend some time looking at the squares 
that were involved in the optimal solution, but failed to realise their significance.2  
--------------------------- 
Figure 2 
--------------------------- 
Figure 3 shows that when group 2, who had failed to find the optimal solution in the 2-
solution problem, were given the 1-solution problem, they exhibited a similar pattern of eye 
movements to the players in group 1 who were solving the 1-solution problem only (the 
interaction between % of time looking at the two sets of squares and time is significant – F (5, 
20)
 
= 5.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .57). The players were looking more at the squares important for the 
optimal solution and less at the squares important for the smothered mate in the last five 
seconds before announcing the solution than they did it the previous stages of the problem 
solving process.  
--------------------------- 
Figure 3  
--------------------------- 
Experiment 2 
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Although they showed that the effect is very powerful, Bilalić et al. (2008) did not fully 
replicate Luchins’ original results (1942) where many participants could not find the solution to 
the 1-solution problem. It is not surprising that expert chess players, three and more standard 
deviations above the skill level of average players, were able to find a three-move mate when 
the distracting effect of the familiar solution was removed. The question remains, however, 
whether the players were affected by the Einstellung effect while they searched for the solution 
in the 1-solution problem. It is possible, for example, that they experienced more difficulty 
solving the 1-solution problem after they had first tried to solve the 2-solution problem. The 
Einstellung effect induced by the 2-solution problem may not have prevented them from 
finding the optimal solution in the 1-solution problem, as was the case with Luchins’ 
participants in the extinction problem, but it might have slowed them down. This possibility is 
suggested by the result of Experiment 1. The players in Group 2 who had already seen the 2-
solution problem took longer (148 s) to find the solution of the 1-solution problem than those in 
Group 1 (79 s) who had not seen the 2-solution problem, although the difference failed to reach 
the conventional level of significance (t(8) = 1.67, p = .13, d = 1.2). In Experiment 2 we 
investigate whether previous experience of the 2-solution problem slows solution of the 1-
solution problem across a range of skill levels. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited three groups of expert chess players, International Masters, 
Masters and Candidate Masters in England (all male), who had not participated in previous 
experiments on the Einstellung effect (see Table 2 for details). Participation was voluntary and 
without reward.  
--------------------------- 
Table 2 
--------------------------- 
Stimulus. This was the 1-solution problem used in Experiment 1 shown in Figure 1b.  
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Design. The players were shown only the 1-solution problem, hence they were not 
experiencing the Einstellung effect. We compared their performance to that of the participants 
of comparable skill level in Bilalić et al.’s (2008) Experiment 1 who saw the 1-solution 
problem after failing to find the optimal solution in the 2-solution problem (Figure 1a) and so 
were experiencing the Einstellung effect. The details of this sub-group from Bilalić et al. (2008) 
are shown in Table 3.  
--------------------------- 
Table 3 
--------------------------- 
Procedure. The problem was shown on the 15” screen of a laptop computer using 
images created with ChessBase 8. Players were told that they should look for the shortest way 
to win and that they would have unlimited time to find the solution. As in normal tournament 
play, the players were not allowed to move the pieces. They were asked to think aloud as they 
tried to solve the problem. A general practice problem (multiplying two 2-digit numbers) and a 
chess specific practice problem (a middle game position) were used to get players familiar with 
the think-aloud method (see Ericsson & Simon, 1993). All players’ statements were tape-
recorded and the solution times were derived from the verbal protocols. The moment when 
players announced that they had found a solution was deemed to be the solution time. The time 
needed to spell out the sequence was not counted in the solution time. All players were tested 
individually. Each session lasted between 10 to 20 minutes. 
Results and discussion 
All players found the optimal solution to the 1-solution problem. Figure 4 shows that at 
each skill level the players in this experiment found the solution in roughly half the time taken 
by the players in the first experiment of Bilalić et al. (2008) who had already seen the problem 
with the familiar solution and so were experiencing Einstellung (t(44) = 2.16, p = .036, d = .65). 
(The interaction between skill and group was not significant (F (2, 40)
 
= 0.9, p > .40, ηp2 = .04.)  
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--------------------------- 
Figure 4 
--------------------------- 
Without the idea of the continuing influence of Einstellung this result would be 
paradoxical. The players in the first experiment were more familiar with the position but were 
slower to find the solution. The Einstellung effect does not stop as soon as the stimulus that 
brought it about is removed. Like a decaying priming effect, it continued to distract the players. 
General Discussion 
In previous research (Bilalić et al., 2008), we showed that the Einstellung effect, the 
blocking of new ideas by the first one that comes to mind, reduced the problem solving ability 
of chess experts to that of players about three standard deviations below them in skill. In the 
present paper we show that the origin of the effect was that players continued to look at the 
squares related to the first idea they had, even though they reported that they were looking for 
alternative solutions. 
The eye movement data suggest a mechanism by which one pattern of thought can 
prevent others coming to mind. As soon as a problem or situation is recognized as familiar, the 
schema for dealing with it is activated. The perceptual mechanisms that lead to recognition and 
the creation of chess experts’ schemata have been spelled out in detail in template theory 
(Gobet & Simon, 1996, 2000) and have been implemented in a computational model (de Groot 
& Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Simon, 2000; Gobet et al., 2001). The schema directs attention 
towards those aspects that are relevant to itself and away from those that are not. This is 
reflected in our study by more time spent on the squares crucial for the familiar solutions than 
on the squares crucial to the optimum solution or on control squares. Again, template theory 
details mechanisms by which what is called the ‘hypothesis’ in the theory - the largest 
perceptual chunk or schema identified so far - directs attention so as to gather more information 
compatible with itself (de Groot & Gobet, 1996, p. 233-234). As John Maynard Keynes 
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claimed in the opening quote, our previous experience starts a self-fulfilling circle which begins 
with information consistent with the already activated schema being more likely to be picked 
up. Consequently the belief that the schema is the right one to deal with the situation is 
confirmed and alternatives are less likely to be considered (Keren, 1984). People think they are 
considering the evidence in an open-minded way, not realising that their attention is being 
selectively directed to only certain aspects of the problem. Those things that they notice do 
indeed fit in with the activated schema and so confirm the view that the way they are dealing 
with the situation is the correct one. Things that do not fit in are either not noticed, or if they 
are, as was the case in this study, not integrated because they do not fit the activated schema. 
It is important to notice that the players looking at the 2-solution problem did spend 
some time on the squares relevant to the optimal solution. It is not that they were completely 
blinded by the familiar solution and did not notice other critical features. The critical features 
associated with the ‘optimal’ squares appear to have been suppressed by the activation of the 
familiar solution because the players spent more time on these squares once the familiar 
solution had been removed (i.e. in the 1-solution problem). It is possible that because of this 
inhibition from the familiar solution the players spent too little time examining the crucial 
features of the problem to make use of that information. The behaviour of the chess players 
resembles the part-set cuing phenomenon where the presentation of the cued items impairs the 
recall of non-cued items (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). (For the application of the 
paradigm in chess see Drinkwater, Dagnall, & Parker, 2006; Watkins, Schwartz, & Lane, 
1984).  
Cognitive mechanisms that prevent us spending time looking for an alternative solution 
to a problem when we already have an adequate one are obviously useful. Simon (1956, 1990) 
showed that in complex real world situations people usually prefer to look for solutions that are 
good enough rather than spending their energy looking for an elusive best that may be out of 
reach. Other researchers (Baron, 1994; Friedrich, 1993; Kanouse, 1972; Schwartz, 1982) have 
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expressed a similar pragmatic view that people lean towards producing desirable outcomes 
instead of determining the truth. The Einstellung effect shows the downside of this time saving 
mechanism when it prevents us finding a better solution. The mechanism of the Einstellung 
effect identified here may be similar to the mechanisms behind negative transfer, confirmation 
bias, and capture or ‘automated action’ errors. They all feature the same theme – familiar 
aspects of the problem activate a schema which in turn controls the behavioural response, in 
this instance, the allocation of attention.  
It is possible that a similar mechanism lies behind a range of well-known biases in 
everyday thought. For example, people accept a lower standard of evidence when accepting 
evidence that supports the view they already hold than they do for evidence that goes against it 
(Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; MacCoun, 1998). Once someone has a formed a strong opinion 
about politics, the character of a colleague or the best way to perform a task, it can be difficult 
to persuade them to think differently. New evidence is ignored and the old point of view 
retained unchanged by the new information (Gardner, 2004; Rokeach, 1960). Just how far this 
fixation can go is demonstrated in insight problems. People repeatedly try to solve the problem 
with the same method even though it has proved unsuccessful (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 1998; 
Grant & Spivey, 2003; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001; Smith, 1995; see also Defeyter & 
German, 2003). Constant failure to find a solution is not enough to change the schema they use. 
The insidious mechanism behind the Einstellung effect operates both in people newly 
introduced to a problem, as with Luchins’ participants and, as we showed here, with people 
operating in a domain with which they have years of experience. It may prevent scientists 
assessing their data objectively. Expert political scientists do not change their theories when 
events prove their predictions wrong; they keep the theory and discount the evidence (Tetlock, 
2005). In a survey of distorted scientific analyses of data on the measurement of human 
intelligence, Gould (1996) concluded: “In most cases … we can be fairly certain that biases … 
were unknowingly influential and that scientists believed they were pursuing unsullied truth” 
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(p. 59). Just like people facing an Einstellung problem in the laboratory, scientists may not 
realize that their favoured theory seems so good because their attention has been directed to 
information that supports it and away from information that does not. 
The mechanism behind the Einstellung effect and similar phenomena is a universal 
characteristic of the human mind – it affects both ordinary people and the most knowledgeable 
experts. A perfect description of the distortion of human thought it produces was given by 
Francis Bacon nearly 400 years ago in the Novum Organum: 
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion ... draws all things else to 
support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances 
to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects or despises, or else by some 
distinction sets aside and rejects; in order that by this great and pernicious 
predetermination the authority of its former conclusion may remain inviolate. ... Men 
mark the events where they are fulfilled, but where they fail, though this happen much 
oftener, neglect and pass them by. But with far more subtlety does this mischief insinuate 
itself into philosophy and the sciences, in which the first conclusion colours and brings 
into conformity with itself all that comes after ... It is the peculiar and particular error of 
the human intellect to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than negatives (p. 36). 
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Footnotes 
1 Chess skill is measured with the Elo rating, an interval scale with a theoretical mean of 
1500 and a theoretical standard deviation of 200 (Elo, 1978). Average players with the rating 
between 1400 and 1600 are called Class C players, 1600-1800 Class B (+1SD above the mean), 
1800-2000 Class A (+2SD), 2000-2200 are called Candidate Masters (+3SD), 2200-2400 
Masters (+4SD), 2400-2500 International Masters (around 5SD above the mean), and finally, 
players above 2500 are called Grand Masters. 
2 In the later stages of the problem players spent more time on squares related to the 
optimal solution than on a random set of non-critical occupied squares – (the analyses available 
from the authors). Thus it seems that the players did become more receptive to the optimal 
solution with time but not sufficiently to prevent them from choosing the familiar solution. We 
are grateful to Neil Charness for suggesting the use of a control set of random squares to test 
the significance of the increase in time spent on the optimal squares apparent in Figure 2a.
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Table 1. The classification, mean Elo rating, mean age, and numbers of participants in 
Experiment 1. 
            ____ 
Classification         Mean Elo ± SD    SDs above mean     Mean age ± SD  n 
            ____ 
 
1-solution 
Candidate Master 2066 ± 28          3     32 ± 14  5 
2-solution 
Candidate Master 2113 ± 54           3     39 ± 10  5 
Total   2090 ± 48                   35 ± 12  10 
            ____ 
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Table 2. Importance estimates on a 7 point likert scale (1 = unimportant; 7 = very important) of 
the squares for the smothered and optimal solution in the 2-solution problem, by a new group of 
experts who did not participate in the study. * indicates those squares where the difference in 
importance between the two solutions is significant at p < .05. 
          
            Solution 
    Smothered mate           Optimal 
Square        M   (SD)            M   (SD)  
          
  b2*         1     (0)             5.3  (2) 
  h6*         4.8  (1.4)             6.9  (.4) 
  h7*         3.2  (1.4)             6.4  (.7) 
  g7*         3.1  (1.8)             6     (1.4) 
  f7*         6.6  (.7)             2.6  (1.7) 
  g5*         6.2  (1.2)             4.9  (1.6) 
  g8*         6.4  (.7)             3.9  (1.8) 
  e6         6.4  (.9)             6     (1.2) 
  f8         4.6  (2.1)             3.6  (2) 
  h8         4.8  (.8)             4.5  (.6) 
  g6         2     (1.4)             1.9  (1.4) 
  f6         1.9  (1.6)             2.4  (1.7) 
         _ 
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Table 3. The classification, mean Elo rating, mean age, and numbers of participants in 
Experiment 2. Group 1 saw only the 1-solution problem. Group 2 had already seen the 2-
solution problem but failed to find the optimum solution. (The Group 2 data are from Bilalić, 
McLeod, & Gobet, 2008) 
            ____ 
Classification         Mean Elo ± SD    SDs above mean     Mean age ± SD  n 
            ____ 
 
Group 1 (1-solution problem only) 
International Master   2406 ± 56          5      28 ± 6  3 
Master   2287 ± 54          4      34 ± 8  9 
Candidate Master 2132 ± 58          3        32 ± 8  11 
Total   2229 ± 115              32 ± 10  23 
Group 2 (2-solution problem, then 1-solution problem ) 
 International Master 2449 ± 26          5       37 ± 12  3 
Master   2316 ± 60          4       39 ± 14  9 
Candidate Master  2129 ± 45          3       27 ± 14  11 
Total    2224 ± 129               33 ± 14  23 
            ____ 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1. a 2-solution problem; b 1-solution problem. (These positions are based on an idea of 
Pertti Saariluoma.) White to move in both problems. In a the familiar smothered mate solution 
is possible: 1. Qe6+ Kh8  2. Nf7+ Kg8  3. Nh6++ Kh8  4. Qg8+ Rxg8  5. Nf7#. The shorter 
optimal solution is: 1. Qe6+ Kh8  2. Qh6 Rd7  3. Qxh7#, or 2.… Kg8  3. Qxg7#.  In b the 
smothered mate is no longer possible because Black’s bishop now covers f7. The optimal 
solution is still possible. 1. Qe6+ Kh8   (If  1..... Kf8  2 Nxh7#)  2. Qh6 Rd7  3. Qxh7#, or 2.… 
Kg8  3. Qxg7#, or 2 … Bg6  3. Qxg7#. The crucial squares for the familiar solution are marked 
by rectangles (f7, g8 & g5) and the optimal solution by circles (b2, h6, h7 & g7) in Figure 1a. 
Figure 2. Average percentage of time (±SE of mean) spent looking at squares crucial to the 
familiar (Smothered Mate) solution and Optimal solution (f7, g5 & g8 and b2, h6, h7 & g7, 
respectively) as a function of time, for (a) players looking at the 2-solution problem and (b) 
players looking at the 1-solution problem. (The two sets of squares are just a subset of the 64 
squares on the chess board and the percentage spent on these three sets of squares is unlikely to 
reach 100%.) 
Figure 3. Average percentage of time (±SE of mean) spent on familiar Smothered Mate 
solution squares and Optimal solution squares in the 1-solution problem as a function of time 
for players who had previously seen the 2-solution problem. (The two sets of squares are just a 
subset of the 64 squares on the chess board and the percentage spent on these two set of 
squares is unlikely to reach 100%.)   
Figure 4. The average time in seconds (±SE of mean) taken to find the optimal solution in the 
1-solution problem by Candidate Masters (CM), Masters (M) and International Masters (IM) 
who had already failed to find it in the 2-solution problem (Group with Einstellung, n = 23) or 
who had not seen the 2-solution problem (Group without Einstellung, n = 23). 
 
Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (in press). Why good thoughts block better ones: The mechanism of the pernicious Einstellung (set) effect. Cognition. 
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